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Abstract 
 
Studies on EU policy making generally disregard the key role played by the Commission 
as an enforcement agent responsible for the instigation and continuation of infringement 
cases.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  employs  both  amicable  (‘management’)  and 
coercive  means  (‘enforcement’)  to  induce  compliance  by  member  states,  which  are 
reflected in the different stages of the infringement proceeding. 
In contrast to current research, this study incorporates the perspective of the Commission 
on non compliance. Based on assumptions about the relation between the Commission 
and  member  states,  it  is  assumed  that  different  mechanisms  drive  the  instigation  of 
infringement proceedings and their escalation to later stages. Thus, it is predicted that 
conflict in the Council and member state low level of acceptance for EU policies increase 
the probability of instigating infringement cases. However, the same factors are expected 
to make escalations of infringements to ECJ referrals less likely, because the Commission 
dependence  on  the  cooperation  of  member  states.  The  hypotheses  are  tested  using  a 
dataset on the policy preferences of the Commission and 15 member states with regards 
to  18  EU  directives.  On  the  basis  of  multinomial  logit  and  ordered  logit  regression 
analyses, I find evidence that there are differences between the effects on the instigation 
and the escalation of infringement cases. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The implementation process in the European Union is defined as the transmission of 
legislation adopted at the European level into the actions of member states (Mastenbroek, 
2007). Member state governments are obliged to incorporate and apply the EU policies 
correctly  and  on  time.  Failure  to  comply  with  EU  legislation  could  result  into  the 
instigation of infringement proceedings by the EU Commission, which consist of three 
formal consecutive stages: “letters of formal notice”, “reasoned opinion” and “referral to 
the European Court of Justice (hereafter the ECJ)”.  
The  infringement  proceedings  instigated  by  the  Commission  are  one  of  the  most 
commonly  used  indicators  for  non compliance  in  quantitative  research  on  the 
implementation of EU law (Mastenbroek, 2005; Kaeding, 2006). Most scholars focus on 
the  instigation  of  either  ‘reasoned  opinions’  and/or  ‘referrals  to  the  ECJ’  by  the 
Commission  to  represent  implementation  failures  by  member  states  (Thomson  et  al, 
2007; Mbaye, 2001; Perkins and Neumeyer, 2007). Recently studies have also focused on 
the resolution of implementation problems by member state governments by looking at 
the  probability  that  infringement  cases  will  escalate  from  letters  of  formal  notice  to 
referrals to the ECJ (Jensen, 2007). However, the use of infringement proceedings as an   2 
indicator for actual non compliance by member states is generally questionable (Börzel, 
2001).  More  precisely,  infringement  proceedings  only  cover  cases  of  detected  non 
compliance, which rely extensively on the monitoring capacity and policy objectives of 
the Commission. Thus, infringement cases should be also viewed from the perspective of 
EU  institutions,  where  the  preferences  and  policy  considerations  of  the  enforcement 
agency are expected to play an important role in the decision to instigate and continue 
infringement  proceedings  (Börzel  et  al.,  2005,  2007).  In  addition,  research  on 
supranational  management  and  enforcement  of  EU  law  argues  that  infringement 
proceedings should be better viewed as a ‘management enforcement ladder’, where the 
stages  of  infringement  procedure  combine  both  amicable  and  coercive  mechanisms 
employed  by  the  Commission  to  resolve  implementation  problems  (Tallberg,  2003; 
Tallberg and Jonsson, 1998). 
This  study  contributes  to  current  research  on  supranational  management  and 
enforcement of EU law by incorporating the perspective of the EU Commission on the 
resolution of compliance problems (Tallberg, 2003; Tallberg and Jonsson, 1998). First, in 
contrast to previous research this article looks both into the instigation and the escalation 
of infringement proceedings to later stages by distinguishing between the decision by the 
Commission  to  open  infringement  cases  in  the  first  place,  the  probability  that 
infringement cases will be resolved at ‘the management phase’ (‘letters of formal notice’ 
and  ‘reasoned  opinions’)  or  will  end  at  the  ‘enforcement  phase’  of  the  infringement 
proceeding (‘referral to the ECJ’). On the basis of theories on the relation between the 
Commission  and  member  states,  it  is  expected  that  conflict  between  member  states, 
member state  and  Commission  policy  priorities  will  affect  the  propensity  of  the 
Commission to open and continue infringement cases. Second, it is expected that conflict 
in the Council and member state policy priorities have different effects on the instigation 
and escalation of infringement cases to referrals to the ECJ.  While conflict in the Council 
and low acceptance for the EU laws are predicted to increase the likelihood of detecting 
implementation problems, it is expected that the same factors diminish the propensity of 
escalation  of  infringement  cases  from  ‘management’  to  ‘enforcement’  phases  of  the 
infringement  procedure.  Third,  this  article  makes  an  empirical  contribution  to  the 
management  and  enforcement  literature  by  showing  that  differences  exist  not  only 
between  the  instigation,  management  and  enforcement  phases  of  the  infringement 
proceeding, but also within the management phase itself (between letters of formal notice 
and reasoned opinions).  
Finally, this study takes into account that infringements are often caused by member 
states’ inability to implement EU laws. Thus, I account for capacity related explanations 
by controlling for both the level of government effectiveness and policy complexity in 
the study on infringement cases. 
 
Theory 
 
General  theories  on  implementation  suggest  that  the  difference  in  most  preferred 
policies between legislators and implementers is a necessary condition for the occurrence 
of  compliance  problems  in  local  political  settings  (Pressman  and  Wildavsky,  1973; 
Torenvlied, 2000). Implementing agents are likely to deviate from the prescribed policies 
when  these  policies  are  not  congruent  with  their  own  goals.  Implementers,  however,   3 
choose to deviate under restrictions, such as their expected reputation loss and expected 
costs from policy deviations (Torenvlied, 2000). The application of different ex-ante and 
ex-post  instruments  for  monitoring  and  sanctioning  policy  deviations  by  ‘oversight 
committees’  affects  the  likelihood  of  costs  and  reputation  loss  by  the  implementer 
(McCubbins et al, 1987, 1989). However, effective oversight requires the allocation of 
resources  and,  hence,  incurs  costs  on  enforcement  agents.  In  other  words,  policy 
considerations and characteristics of the enforcement agents also have an influence on the 
resolution of implementation problems. 
There  are  strong  parallels  between  the  Commission  in  the  context  of  EU  policy 
making and ‘oversight committees’ in national political settings. In the European context 
the Commission has extensive powers to issue warnings to member state governments 
with  a  questionable  implementation  record  using  informal  and  formal  letters,  and  to 
pursue  formal  infringement  proceedings  before  the  ECJ  in  case  of  persistent  non 
compliance. The Commission even has the power to propose, before the ECJ, punitive 
fines to be issued against member states that violate the EU law (Pollack, 2003: 86). As a 
result,  theories  on  EU  policy  implementation  should  incorporate  the  role  of  the 
Commission on compliance with EU policies. 
 
 
Infringement proceedings as a ‘management-enforcement ladder’ 
 
 The  perspective  of  the  Commission  is  taken  into  account  in  recent  studies  on 
supranational management and enforcement of EU laws (Tallberg, 2003; Jönsson and 
Tallberg, 1998). Management implies that compliance problems are addressed through 
amicable  means,  such  as  problem solving  strategies  and  dispute settlement  dialogues 
between  the  Commission  and  member  state  governments.  Enforcement,  by  contrast, 
refers to deterrence by coercive means such as increasing the costs of member state non 
compliance by credible threat of sanctions by the ECJ (Tallberg, 2003). 
 European  scholars  generally  argue  that  the  joint  effect  of  management  and 
enforcement  strategies  is  represented  in  the  infringement  proceedings  initiated  by the 
Commission  against  member  state  governments  (Tallberg,  2003;  Börzel  et  al,  2005, 
2007). Infringements are, thus, seen as a ‘management – enforcement ladder’, where the 
Commission progressively increases the costs of non compliance with each consecutive 
stage of the infringement procedure (Jönsson and Tallberg, 1998; Tallberg, 2003). Formal 
notices  and  reasoned  opinions  represent  a  managerial  approach  to  implementation 
problems as they give rise to formal and informal dialogues between the Commission and 
member states that aim at negotiated solutions to compliance problems (Börzel et al, 
2005).  During  these  stages  the  Commission  informs  itself  about  the  reasons  of  non 
compliant behavior by member states and provides an opportunity to member states to 
correct  their  behavior  without  involving  the  ECJ  in  the  conflict.  Provided  that 
management strategies are not sufficient to induce compliant behavior by member states, 
the Commission resorts to more coercive approach by referring the member state to the 
ECJ. Court litigations increase the costs of non compliance for  member states  as the 
threat of sanctions becomes imminent. Considering that the majority of court cases are 
won by the Commission, the probability of negotiating an implementation outcome that 
best suits the member state is non existent once the government has been referred to the   4 
ECJ  (Jönsson  and  Tallberg,  1998).  In  addition,  referral  to  the  ECJ  increases  the 
probability of ‘reputation losses’ for member state governments, as persistent failure to 
conform to international agreements becomes known to the whole European community. 
However, both the Commission and member states share interest in avoiding costly and 
resource consuming litigation and try to find some last minute compromise in bilateral 
negotiations before the ‘referral stage’ (Börzel, 2001; Pollack, 2003).  
 
Conditions for instigation and resolution of infringement cases 
 
Given that the Commission has full discretion on the decision whether to open and 
continue infringement proceedings to later stages, the perspective of the Commission 
plays an important role on whether infringement cases are resolved by more managerial 
approach or lead to referral to the ECJ. However, infringements are also the outcome of 
member states’ (persistent) failure to comply with their EU obligations. Thus, both the 
instigation and escalation of infringement cases revolve around the characteristics of and 
the relation between the Commission and member states (Jönsson and Tallberg, 1998).  
The relation between the Commission and member states could be best seen from the 
lenses  of  more  general  theories  on  the  dependency  relation  between  ‘principals’  and 
‘agents’. In the policy making context, the principal is the legislator and the agent is the 
implementation agency. Theories on delegation identify two main principles that guide 
the behaviour of both legislators and implementers (Huber and Shipan, 2002). First, there 
is  an  asymmetry  of  information  between  legislators  and  implementers  such  that 
implementers  have  a  better  knowledge  about  the  consequences  of  a  policy,  while 
legislators  lack  such  information.  Second,  both  legislators  and  implementers  have 
specific policy objectives, which may or may not conform to the final policy outcome 
that is to be implemented. The interaction between these two principles is expected define 
the type and level of control that the legislator needs to exercise to accomplish his or her 
objectives. 
In the European context, and particularly during the infringement proceedings, the 
principal agent relation is more complex than standard principal agent applications. First, 
the main actors consist of the enforcement body and a member state government, rather 
than  a  national  legislator  and  an  implementation  agency.    Second,  the  Commission 
assumes different responsibilities in the decision making and the implementation stages, 
which give rise to contrasting predictions on the instigation of infringement cases and the 
escalation of infringements from ‘management’ to ‘enforcement’ phases.  
 
Information asymmetry and conflict in the Council 
 
In  the  EU  policy making  process  both  the  Commission  and  member  state 
governments  assume  different  roles  that  create  asymmetric  information  advantages, 
which  shift  between  the  two  actors  (Peters,  2000).  During  EU  decision making,  the 
member states in the Council are the ‘principals’, while the Commission is the  ‘agent’ 
responsible for drafting policy proposals and submitting them the Council for approval. 
Thus, the main goal of the Commission during the decision making process is to secure 
agreement with its proposals, under the restriction that member states in the Council often 
have conflicting policy goals (Pollack, 2000)   5 
As  a  result  conflict  in  the  Council  influences  the  information  advantage  of  the 
Commission, which the Commission consequently uses to both foster an agreement with 
its policy proposals and allocate resources to monitoring. More precisely, member states 
signal their policy preferences in an attempt to make the Commission attentive to their 
different policy objectives (Tallberg, 2000). As a result, the Commission has an incentive 
not to inform member states about the full implications of problematic policies (Jordan, 
1999;  Cini,  2003;  Versluis,  2004).  Member  state’s  conflicting  policy  preferences,  in 
addition,  signal  to  the  Commission  the  possibility  of  problems  during  national 
implementation that could lead to divergent implementation practices across the member 
states. As a result, conflict in the Council fosters increased vigilance by the Commission 
and  consequently  increases  the  probability  that  violations  will  be  detected  and 
infringement proceedings will be instigated (Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied, 2009). 
 
H1a:  Conflict in the Council of the EU has a positive effect on the probability that the 
Commission will open infringement proceedings against member state governments. 
 
Once infringement cases have been instigated, the Commission assumes a different 
role: bring detected member states’ deviation into compliance by increasing the pressure 
on member states’ with each consecutive stage of the infringement procedure. However, 
the Commission again faces certain  restrictions  in its decision to escalate cases  from 
management to enforcement phases of the infringement proceeding. More precisely, in 
the  implementation  stage  the  Commission  and  member  states  change  roles:  the 
Commission is the principal, while the member state governments are the agents charged 
with applying the EU policies into national settings. Thus, the information advantage 
shifts from the Commission to the member state governments (Peters, 2000).  Member 
state governments have better knowledge about the application of EU policies in their 
national  contexts  than  the  Commission  does.  As  a  result,  the  Commission  is  in  an 
‘invidious  position’  given  its  limited  resources  to  enforce  compliance  as  well  as  its 
dependence  on  the  cooperation  of  member  states  in  the  decision making  process 
(Williams, 1994). As the information asymmetry shifts in favour of the member state 
governments, the Commission might prefer not to stir up trouble with non compliant 
states in the implementation stage if such an action would endanger securing agreements 
for policy proposals in the subsequent decision making stages (Snyder, 1993; Jordan, 
1999). Thus, it is expected that the Commission will be unwilling to increase the costs on 
non compliance  by  member  states  for  policies  adopted  under  high  levels  of  conflict 
between the member state representatives in the Council. Future cooperation is less likely 
to happen when the Commission sues member states for non compliance with highly 
controversial policies (Versluis, 2004; Steunenberg, 2007). 
In  other  words,  conflict  between  member  states  in  the  Council  makes  negotiated 
solutions  to  compliance  problems  (management  phase)  more  desirable  than  coercive 
means such as referral to the ECJ (enforcement phase).  
 
H1b: Conflict in the Council of the EU has a negative effect on the probability that 
infringement  cases  will  escalate  from  ‘management’  to  ‘enforcement’  phases  of  the 
infringement proceeding 
   6 
Member-state policy acceptance  
 
In addition to the asymmetry of information, the level of acceptance of EU policies 
by implementers is the second factor that affects the principal agent relation between the 
Commission and member states during the implementation process. Government support 
for the EU and societal attitudes within the member states influence the extent to which 
member  states  are  willing  to  accept  the  EU  policies.  For  instance,  infringements  are 
generally expected to occur as a result of negative political and ideological preferences of 
individual  member  state  governments  towards  the  EU  (Mbaye,  2001;  König  and 
Luetgert, 2008). Thus, governments that generally disapprove of the EU influence on 
policy making  are  expected  to  run  into  more  compliance  problems  during 
implementation  than  pro European  governments.  The  reason  is  that  anti integrationist 
governments are likely to put less priority on the implementation of EU directives when 
they can instead allocate resources to more desirable policy objectives.  
In addition, the perceived legitimacy of the EU and the Commission in particular by 
member state societies are also expected to affect the priorities governments put on the 
implementation of European directives (Mbaye, 2001). Thus, low levels of societal trust 
in the EU institutions could be an additional motivation for member state governments to 
choose  to  deviate  from  their  EU  policy  obligations.  Consequently,  infringements  are 
more likely to occur. 
 
H2a: Anti European government preferences and negative societal attitudes towards the 
EU and the Commission in particular have a positive effect on the probability that the 
Commission will open infringement proceedings against member state governments. 
 
EU scholars generally predict a linear relationship between political and ideological 
preferences of governments and citizens and non compliance by member states. Thus, 
negative  government  and  societal  attitudes  towards  the  EU  are  expected  to  always 
increase the probability of instances of non compliant behaviour by member states such 
as delays in transposition (Kaeding, 2006, 2008; Thomson et al, 2007; Toshkov, 2008).  
 In the case of infringement proceedings, however, different mechanisms are expected 
to drive the decision of the Commission to switch to enforcement strategies against non 
compliance.  Given  the  ‘invidious  position’  of  the  Commission  in  the  implementation 
stage, it is expected that it will be less willing to run the risk of offending anti European 
member states by referring them to the ECJ (Börzel, 2001). In this case, a managerial 
means  to  compliance  problems  will  be  the  preferred  approach  instead  of  employing 
coercive means and thus endangering the Commission’s integrationist goals.  
 
H2b: Anti European government preferences and negative societal attitudes towards the 
EU have a negative effect on the probability that infringements will escalate from 
‘management’ to ‘enforcement’ phases of infringement proceedings 
 
 
 
 
   7 
 
      Commission policy acceptance 
 
The level of policy acceptance of the principal is also likely to have an effect on the 
implementation process and in this case, on infringement proceeding. As already noted, 
in the EU implementation process the principal is the enforcement body in the face of the 
Commission. Just like member states, the Commission also prioritizes compliance with 
directives based on its policy preferences. Both monitoring and managing compliance 
problems come at a price and are highly sensitive to the limited resources available to the 
Commission (Jensen, 2007). For example, monitoring is a time consuming process that 
requires the mobilization of different sources of information. As a result, it is expected 
that when the Commission disagrees with the content of a directive it is less likely to 
allocate resources for managing and/or enforcing compliance.  
This does not imply, however, that implementation problems are less likely to occur 
in cases of Commission disagreement with the outcome of the decision making. It only 
means that the Commission will be less likely to open infringement proceedings against 
member  states  for  directives  that  are  not  congruent  with  the  Commission’s  policy 
preferences. 
 
H3: Commission disagreement with the outcome of decision making has a negative 
effect on the probability that the Commission will open and continue infringement 
proceedings against member state governments. 
 
 
Research design 
 
Data and policy selection 
 
The hypotheses are tested using a dataset that was constructed on the basis of several 
sources.  First,  information  on  infringement  proceedings  was  obtained  by  the  Annual 
Reports  on  Monitoring  and  Application  of  EU  Law  published  in  the  Commission 
databases. Based on these reports, we identified the stage of each infringement case and 
the member state against which it was issued. Second, data on the policy preferences of 
the Commission and the 15 member states were provided by the DEU dataset (Thomson 
et al, 2006). The selection of proposals in the DEU dataset was based on three criteria. 
First, the selected proposals had to be subject to either the co decision or the consultation 
procedure, and the procedure should not have been changed after the Amsterdam Treaty 
came  into  force  in  1999.  Second,  the  selected  proposals  had  to  be  discussed  in  the 
Council meetings between 1998 and 2001. Third, all selected proposals had to contain at 
least one controversial issue. A random sample would have led to the inclusion of issues 
with only marginal, technical importance, where member states would have taken similar 
positions (Thomson and Stokman, 2003; Thomson et al., 2007).  
In this study I focus only on proposals for directives. This confines the analysis to a 
maximum of 26 directives, which cover a variety of policy areas, such as internal market 
(nine  directives),  economic  and  financial  affairs  (five  directives),  agriculture  (three 
directives),  transport  (three  directives),  justice  and  home  affairs  (one  directive),   8 
employment (one directive), energy (one directive) and health (one directive). However, I 
did not include information on all 26 directives in the analysis of this study. For example, 
two  directives  dropped  from  the  analysis,  since  they  have  been  adopted  relatively 
recently  and  infringement  proceedings  were  still  ongoing.  In  addition,  I  excluded  all 
directives  that  did  not  contain  any  infringement  cases  against  a  member  state  (nine 
directives).  For  these  directives,  I  could  not  be  certain  whether  the  absence  of 
infringements means that there were no compliance problems, or formal notices were 
sent anonymously to member states
1. In total I have information on 17 directives and 15 
member states, which leads to 265 cases available for analysis
2. Out of these 265 cases 
the Commission has instigated 179 infringements against member states.    
 
Dependent variable: measurement 
 
Because I want to distinguish between the instigation of infringement proceedings, 
managerial and enforcement strategies by the Commission, the dependent variable in this 
study consists of three categories. The first category includes those cases, in which the 
Commission did not instigate infringements against a member state regarding a particular 
directive (1 = “No infringements”). In the second category I included all cases which 
ended  either  in  the  stage  of  ‘letter  of  formal  notice’  or  ‘reasoned  opinion’  (2  = 
“Management phase”). The third final category consists of the infringement cases that 
were referred to the ECJ (3 = “Enforcement phase”). Figure 1 illustrates the distribution 
of the three different categories of the dependent variable. The majority of cases ended in 
the ‘management phase’ (134 cases), followed by the category ‘no infringements’ (87 
cases) and cases that ended at the “enforcement phase” (referral to the ECJ) (44 cases).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Moreover, based on the Commission database Euro Lex members state did experience delays in the 
transposition of these 9 directives, which would mean that at least some member states should have 
received formal notices and/or reasoned opinions by the Commission. 
2 17 x 15 = 255. The total number of cases is 265, however, since some member states received more than 
one letter of formal notice and reasoned opinion for particular directives.   9 
Figure 1: Distribution of the dependent variable: Infringement category 
 
 
 
Independent variables: measurement 
 
The measure of conflict in the Council is on the directive level and is based on data on 
the policy positions of member states’ representatives in the Council of the EU regarding 
particular  policy  issues. These  data  were  collected  by  Thomson  et  al  (2006) through 
interviews with key informants (see Thomson et al., 2006 and Thomson et al., 2007 for a 
full  discussion  and  illustration  of  the  construction  of  issue  scales).  Based  on  the 
informants’ reports, it is possible to construct a direct measure of conflict on the basis of 
distances between policy positions that member states took during the decision making 
process.  
In addition, this study employs policy polarization as a measure of conflict, which is 
based on the polarization index developed by Esteban and Ray (1994). I find this measure 
of conflict more appropriate than standard measures of spread in policy positions. More 
precisely, policy polarization, stresses both alienation between and identification within 
groups of member states: internally homogenous groups might be highly antagonistic 
towards each other, even if their level of alienation is moderate. Alienation is measured 
by taking the absolute distance between groups of member states that share a different 
policy  position.  Identification  is  a  function  of  the  relative  group  size  π,  and  a 
‘polarization  sensitivity’  parameter  α,  which  is  bounded  between  0  and  1.6  to 
differentiate polarization from inequality (see Esteban and Ray, 1994). In the present 
study  α  is  set  to  1.6.  For  the  computation  of  relative  group  size  π  we  differentiated 
between directives decided under unanimity and under QMV. For unanimity, I computed 
π as the proportion of member states supporting the same policy position relative to the 
total  number  of  member  states.  For  QMV,  we  computed  π  for  each  group  as  the 
aggregated member state Shapley Shubik Index (SSI) score (Shapley and Shubik, 1954; 
Thomson and Stokman, 2003). 
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Dependent variable   10 
Information  on  government  support  for  the  EU  was  obtained  from  the  Manifesto 
dataset “Mapping policy preferences II…1990 2003”, which measures party preferences 
on the basis of statements made by national parties in their manifestos (Klingermann, 
2006). I took the mean national party government position on the issue of support for EU 
integration  as  a  measure.  Alternative  datasets  that  include  government  preferences 
towards EU integration are the “Party Policy in Modern Democracies” project (Benoit 
and Laver, 2006) and the Chapel Hill expert survey on party positions (Marks et al., 
2006). However, the dataset by Benoit and Laver (2006) covers data on one time point 
only.  The  Chapel  Hill  expert  survey  also  has  limitations,  since  it  does  not  contain 
information on Luxembourg. The manifesto dataset was chosen, because it covers all 15 
member states and most government positions regarding EU integration except the most 
recent ones. The few missing party positions were imputed using the “Party Policy in 
Modern Democracies” project
3.  
The measure of societal distrust towards the Commission relies on information from 
1999 2004 Eurobarometer data that reflects overall satisfaction of the EU citizens with 
the EU and the EU institutions (Mbaye, 2001; Kaeding, 2006). The question used in this 
study specifically asks whether EU citizens tend to trust or not the Commission. Based on 
the answers to this question I computed a net distrust score by subtracting the percentage 
responding  “tend  to  trust”  from  the  percentage  responding  “tend  not  to  trust”  the 
Commission (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993 for a similar operationalization of societal 
support  for  EU  integration)
4.  Thus,  higher  levels  mean  more  distrust  towards  the 
Commission. 
Both  government  support  towards  the  EU  and  societal  distrust  towards  the 
Commission are averaged for the years from the adoption of the directive until the end of 
the infringement procedure (or the deadline  for the cases, in which no infringements 
occurred) (Toshkov, 2008). 
Similar to the measure of conflict in the Council, information on the Commission’s 
disagreement  with  the  outcome  of  decision making  is  obtained  from  Thomson  et  al. 
(2006). It is measured at the level of the directive as the average distance between the 
Commission’s  position  on  an  issue  and  a  policy  outcome  (Thomson  et  al.,  2007; 
Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied, 2009). 
 
Controls 
 
In this study I control for the level of conflict between the Commission and a member 
state. The variable is computed by taking the absolute value of the distance between a 
                                                 
3 I  also computed an alternative measure for government support based on the Chapel Hill study. There 
were no substantive differences between the effects of the two measures.  
4 Studies employing the Eurobarometer data generally measure societal attitudes towards the EU with the 
question: “Do you see your country’s membership of the Union as a ‘good thing’?” (Mbaye, 2001; 
Kaeding, 2006; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). The measure employed here, however, specifically refers to 
societal attitudes towards the Commission and it is preferred for the purposes of this study. In addition, it  is 
very highly correlated with the measure on EU support employed by other scholars.   11 
member  state’  policy  position and the  policy  position  supported  by  the  Commission. 
Thus, it is measured at the individual level
5. 
 I also control for political and administrative capacity limitations that might cause 
the occurrence and escalation of infringement cases in addition to the factors described 
above. I employ a measure of government effectiveness that is based on the World Bank 
Governance Indicators (Kaufman et al, 2005). ‘Government effectiveness’ combines the 
quality  of  public  services,  the  quality  of  the  civil  service  and  the  degree  of  its 
independence  from  political  pressures,  the  quality  of  policy  formulation  and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.  
In  addition,  I  control  for  directive level  ‘capacity  explanations’  such  as  the 
complexity of a directive, which is measured by the number of recitals. Recitals precede 
the body of a directive and give the reasons behind the different provisions (Kaeding, 
2006). A large number of recitals indicate that the directive has an extensive scope of 
requirements, as well as addressing a high number of important issues (Toshkov, 2008). 
Thus, recitals could be also seen as a measure of salience for the Commission to pursue 
compliance with a directive. 
Table 1 provides information on the variables included in the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 I checked for the possibility of collinearity between the independent variables by both inspecting the 
correlation matrix amongst the independent variables and checking the tolerance and variance inflation 
factors.  No evidence for major concern were found.   12 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
 
 
Design of analyses  
 
Because  the  dependent  variable  consists  of  three  distinct  categories  different 
statistical approaches are possible. One approach is to apply ordered logistic regression 
(Long, 1997; Jensen, 2007).  Infringement cases can be resolved at earlier or later stages 
and the Commission increases the pressure on member states’ compliance with every 
subsequent stage of the infringement procedure. However, the conditions that lead to the 
instigation of infringement cases are expected to be different from those that lead to the 
escalation  of  infringements  to  later  stages.  These  predictions  defy  some  of  the  key 
assumptions  of  models  with  ordinal  variables  (Long,  1997;  Long  and  Freese,  2003).                                  
An alternative approach would be to ignore the directional meaning of the dependent 
variable and employ multinomial logistic regression (Kaeding, 2006, 2008). 
Having these considerations in mind, I divide the results section into two parts. I first 
run  a  multinomial  logistic  model  to  see  whether  there  are  differences  between  the 
categories  of  no  instigation  of  infringement  cases,  infringements  ending  at  the 
‘management phase’ and infringements ending at the ‘enforcement phase’. Subsequently, 
to account for the directional meaning of infringement proceedings, I also run ordered 
logistic analyses on the 179 infringement cases instigated by the Commission. Thus, in 
the  second  part  of  the  analysis  I  focus  on  the  escalation  of  infringement  cases  from 
  N  Mean  Minimum  Maximum  S.d.  
Dependent variable           
     Infringement category  265  1.74  1.00  3.00  .69 
           
Independent variables           
     Conflict in the Council (policy polarization)  265  11.31  .00  16.57  6.00 
      Government support towards the EU  265  3.33   .19  9.91  2.13 
      Societal distrust towards the Commission  265   23.21   50.50  11.50  17.67 
      Commission disagreement with an EU policy  265  42.76  14.33  75.00  16.93 
           
 Controls           
       Conflict b/n the Commission and a member state  263  35.86  .00  100.00  32.03 
       Government Effectiveness  265  1.72  .58  2.21  .42 
       Policy Complexity (N of recitals)  265  30.05  9.00  65.00  16.29   13 
‘management’ to ‘enforcement’ stages, and disregard the instigation of infringements by 
the Commission (Jensen, 2007)
6.   
 
Results 
 
 Instigation, management and enforcement phases of infringement proceedings 
 
Table  2  presents  the  results  from  the  multinomial  logistic  model.  The  baseline 
category is the ‘management’ phase, to which the categories ‘no infringements’
7 and 
‘enforcement’ are compared. It is important to note that we cannot derive any conclusions 
about the precise change in the predicted probability for any of the three outcomes of the 
dependent variable. The coefficients show, however, which outcome is more likely to 
occur relative to the baseline category due to an increase in the values of the relevant 
independent variable and whether the difference is significant.  
The results in Table 2 show that conflict in the Council has a significant effect on the 
dependent  variable:  the  infringement  category  at  which  a  case  is  likely  to  end.  As 
predicted,  infringement  cases  are  more  likely  to  end  up  at  the  ‘management’  phase 
(letters of formal notice and reasoned opinions), than not being instigated at all. In other 
words, the Commission is more likely to open infringement cases due to an increase in 
the policy polarization measure. However, the coefficient of the polarization variable is 
only  marginally  significant  (under  p  <  .10).  On  the  other  hand,  I  observe  a  larger 
difference between the likelihood of an infringement case ending at the ‘management’ 
phase and an infringement case ending at the ‘enforcement’ phase. Thus, an increase in 
the value of policy polarization in the Council of the EU decreases the likelihood that the 
Commission  will  refer  a  member  state  to  the  ECJ  instead  of  trying  to  resolve 
implementation problems at earlier stages of the infringement procedure. This result is in 
line with Hypothesis 1b that the Commission is less likely to resort to coercive means 
when decisions were adopted under high levels of polarization in the Council 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Thus, assuming that the costs and pressure on member states’ compliance increase with each subsequent 
stage of the infringement procedure, I distinguish between 3 categories: cases ending at the ‘letters formal 
notice’, ‘reasoned opinion’ and ‘referral to the ECJ’. 
7 A negative effect on the category ‘no infringements’ indicates an increase in the average probability that 
infringement cases will be instigated against the particular member state   14 
 
Table 2: Multinomial logistic regression on the instigation and escalation of infringement cases 
 
  Outcomes 
 
 
Variable  No infringements  Enforcement phase 
 
  Coef (s.e.)  Coef (s.e.) 
      Conflict in the Council (policy polarization)   .053
* (.027)
   .074
** (.036)
 
      Government support for EU  .083 (.070)
        .140
 (.090)
 
      Societal distrust towards the Commission    .008 (.009)    .018 (.012) 
     Commission disagreement with an EU policy  .019 (.016)  .035
* (.018) 
    Controls     
    Conflict b/n the Commission and a member state  .005 (.005)   .019
** (.007) 
     Government effectiveness  .694
* (408)  .455 (479) 
     Policy Complexity (number of recitals)   .025
** (.013)
  .035
* (.018)
 
     
       Log likelihood   240.290   
       Wald  χ
 2     263.23
***   
       Pseado R
2   .095    
       N  263   
The managerial stage is the comparison group; robust standard errors both at the member state  and the 
directive level, Wald χ
 2 estimate for clustering in directives. 
 
Figure 2 provides a visual representation of the change in the out of sample predicted 
probabilities
8  for  each  of  the  three  categories  due  to  an  increase  in  the  value  of  the 
polarization measure. The other independent variables are held constant at their means. 
Figure  2  confirms  the  result  in  Table  2  that  there  is  a  clear  distinction  between  the 
‘management’  phase  relative  to  both  the  ‘no  infringements’  category  and  the 
‘enforcement’  phase.  While  there  is  almost  no  difference  between  the  predicted 
probabilities  for  the  outcomes  ‘no  infringements’  and  ‘management’  when  there  is 
absolute consensus in the Council of the EU, the difference between these two categories 
increases as conflict in the Council escalates. The difference is even greater between the 
predicted  probabilities  for  a  case  ending  at  the  ‘management’  and  the  ‘enforcement’ 
phases. By contrast, there doesn’t seem to be a significant difference between the ‘no 
infringements’ category and ‘enforcement’ due to an increase in the level of conflict in 
the Council. In sum, I do find support for hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
 
                                                 
8 Out of sample predictions are generated on simulated data, but are as informative as in sample 
predictions (which are based on actual data). In addition, out of sample predictions are better for 
representation purposes, since they are less ‘noisy’ than actual data.   15 
 
Figure 2: Out of sample predicted probabilities for the effect of conflict in the Council 
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Based  on  the  results  in  Table  2,  there  are  no  significant  differences  between  the 
categories  ‘no  infringements’  and  ‘enforcement’  relative  to  the  middle  category 
‘management’ due to  changes in  government  support  for  EU  integration  and  societal 
distrust towards the Commission. Commission disagreement with an EU policy does not 
significantly affect the outcomes of the dependent variable either.  
With regards to the control variables there is no significant effect of conflict between 
the Commission and a member state on the likelihood that infringement cases will be 
instigated  by  the  Commission.  However,  higher  level  of  conflict  between  the 
Commission and a member state significantly decreases the likelihood of a case being 
resolved at the ‘enforcement’ of the infringement procedure.  
I  also  find  mixed  evidence  for  ‘capacity based  explanations’.  Government 
effectiveness has a marginally significant positive effect on the likelihood of instigating 
infringement  cases.  However,  government  effectiveness  does  not  explain  differences 
between  the  ‘management’  and  ‘enforcement’  phases.  The  number  of  recitals  in  a 
directive has a significant effect on the dependent variable. Higher number of recitals 
increases  the  average  probability  that  infringement  cases  will  be  instigated  against 
member  states.  The  likelihood  that  a  case  will  end  at  the  ‘enforcement’  phase  also 
increases as a function of the number of recitals, but the coefficient is only marginally 
significant (p < .10). This result supports previous findings that compliance problems 
often occur due to the policy complexity of directives (Kaeding, 2006, 2008; Toshkov, 
2008). 
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The escalation of infringement proceedings from earlier to later stages 
 
The  results  from  the  multinomial  logistic  model  could  be  complemented  with 
additional analyses on the escalation of infringement cases from earlier to later stages. 
Based on the fact that enforcement occurs only after more amicable means have failed, 
one should take into account the directional meaning of infringement proceedings, which 
was  disregarded  in  the  multinomial  logistic  model.    In  addition,  ordered  logistic 
regression could also help identify some of the reasons for the weak support I find in 
Table 2 regarding some of the predictions. Thus, instead of collapsing letters of formal 
notice and  reasoned  opinions  into  one  category,  the  analysis shows  the  escalation  of 
infringement cases from ‘letters of formal notice’ to ‘referrals to the ECJ’.  
Table 3 presents two ordered logit models on the likelihood that infringement cases 
will escalate from earlier to later stages. Model 1 includes only the variables for the 
predicted effects, while the control variables are added in Model 2.  
 
Table 3: Ordered logistic regression on the escalation of infringement cases to later stages 
 
     
Variable  Model 1  Model 2 
 
 
   
      Conflict in the Council   .062
** (.025)
   .069
** (.029)
 
      Government support for the EU  .137 (.125)
  .166 (.125) 
      Societal distrust towards the Commission    .028
*** (.010)   .025
** (.012) 
     Commission disagreement with a EU policy  .014 (.011)    .038
*** (.012) 
    Controls     
    Conflict b/n the Commission and a member state       .014
*** (.005) 
     Government effectiveness         .105 (435) 
     Policy Complexity (number of recitals) 
  .040
*** (.010)
 
     
       Log likelihood    179.320   169.229 
        Wald  χ
 2  †  23.96
***  61.20
*** 
        Wald  χ
 2 ††  18.07
***  41.60
*** 
       Pseado R
2 †  .058  .107 
       Pseado R
2 ††  .055  .107 
       N  178  177 
               † = clusters in directives; †† = clusters in member states 
 
Similar to the results in Table 2, conflict in the Council has a negative significant 
effect on the likelihood that infringement cases will escalate to Court referrals.  In Figure   17 
3, I explore the precise change in the predicted probability of an infringement case ending 
at each of the three possible infringement stages due to an increase in the values of the 
polarization measure. Figure 3 shows that the predicted probability of an infringement 
case ending with a ‘letter of formal notice’ increases from .39 to .68 as conflict on the 
Council increases from 0 to 16, while holding the other variables at their means. By 
contrast, the probability of an infringement case ending at the final stage “referral to the 
ECJ” decreases from .25 to .10 as the level of conflict in the Council (policy polarization) 
increases. It is interesting to note that the predicted probability of a case ending with 
‘reasoned opinion’ also decreases as conflict in the Council escalates. Thus, difference 
exists  not  only  between  the  ‘management’  and  ‘enforcement’  phases  of  infringement 
proceedings,  but  there  is  also  a  difference  within  the  ‘management’  phase:  between 
letters of formal notice and reasoned opinions. It appears that conflict in the Council 
speeds up the resolution of infringements already at the stage of ‘letters of formal notice’. 
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Figure 3: Predicted probabilities for independent effects
 
 
Government support for the EU doesn’t have a significant effect on the escalation of 
infringement cases. However, contrary to the results in Table 2, societal distrust towards 
the Commission has a significant negative effect on the dependent variable. Figure 4 
shows that the predicted probability of a case being resolved with letters of formal notice 
increases  from  .29  to  .65  as  the  level  of  societal  distrust  towards  the  Commission 
increases,  when  holding  the  other  independent  variable  constant  at  their  means.  By 
contrast, the probability of a case reaching the final stage of infringement proceedings 
decreases from .33 to .10. Similar to the effect of conflict in the Council, the probability 
of a case ending at the stage of ‘reasoned opinion’ decreases as societal distrust towards 
the Commission goes up. The observation that the effects on letters of formal notice and 
reasoned  opinions  differ  could  be  one  of  the  explanations  for  the  weak  statistical 
evidence we find when we collapse the two infringement stages in one category. 
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Figure 4: Predicted probabilities for independent effects
 
 
 
Based on the results in Table 3, we again do not find support for the prediction that 
Commission  disagreement  with  a  policy  decreases  the  probability  of  escalation  of 
infringement cases to later stages. Conflict between the Commission and a member state 
does have a negative significant effect on the escalation of infringement cases. Holding 
the other independent variables constant, the predicted probability of a case ending at the 
‘formal  notice’  stage  increase  from  .34  to  .67  as  the  level  of  conflict  between  the 
Commission and a member state grows. The probability that the Commission will refer a 
member state to the ECJ decreases from .28 to .09 (see Figure 5).  
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Finally,  I  pay  some  attention  to  the  effects  of  the  capacity based  variables. 
Government  effectiveness  does  not  significantly  affect  the  escalation  of  infringement 
cases to later stages. The number of recitals, however once again, has a significant effect 
on the dependent variable. An increase in the number of recitals from the minimum of 9 
to the maximum of 65 decreases the probability that a case will be resolved at the formal 
notice stage from .68 to .18. On the other hand, the probability of referral to the ECJ 
increases from .09 to .47 as the number of recitals in a directive grows (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Predicted probabilities for independent effects
 
           
 
 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
 
This study makes three main contributions to the field of EU policy implementation. 
First, I incorporated the perspective of the Commission in the study on non compliance 
by member states. Scholars on EU implementation generally disregard the role of the 
enforcement  body  on  the  resolution  of  compliance  problems.  Second,  this  study 
contributes  to  the  literature  on  supranational  management  and  enforcement  of  EU 
legislation by viewing infringement proceedings as a ‘management enforcement ladder’ 
(Tallberg,  2003).  While  scholars  theoretically  distinguish  between  management  and 
enforcement  phases  of  the  infringement  proceeding,  little  effort  has  been  made  to 
empirically  test  the  factors  that  influence  the  escalation  of  infringement  cases  from 
management to enforcement phases. Finally, I made both a theoretical and an empirical 
distinction between the instigation of infringement cases and their continuation to ‘ECJ 
referrals’.  More  precisely,  I  arrived  at  contrasting  predictions  on  the  effects  on  the 
instigation and escalation of infringement cases. Drawing on theories on the principal 
agent relation, it is expected that conflict between member states during decision making 
and  low  level  of  member state  acceptance  of  EU  legislation  positively  influence  the 
likelihood that infringement cases will opened by the Commission. By contrast, these   20 
same factors are expected to discourage the Commission from increasing the pressure on 
member  states  to  comply  with  EU  laws.  In  addition, it was  expected that  the  policy 
preferences of the enforcement body in the face of the Commission negatively influence 
the decision to instigate and continue infringement cases. 
The first main finding of this study refers to the effect of conflict between member 
states. More precisely conflict in the Council, indeed, had a negative influence on the 
likelihood that the Commission will refer a member state to the ECJ once infringement 
proceedings had been opened. This finding was consistent with the results from both 
analyses  employed  in  this  study.  Based  on  the  analyses  neither  member state  nor 
Commission acceptance of a policy seem to influence infringement proceedings. 
The second main finding relates to the measurement of the dependent variable.  More 
precisely,  the  analysis  on  the  escalation  of  infringements  to  later  stages  showed  that 
differences  exist  not  only  between  the  management  and  enforcement  phases  of  the 
infringement procedure, but also within the management phase itself. Thus, the effects on 
the resolution of infringements at the stage of ‘reasoned opinion’ are more similar to the 
effects on reaching ECJ referrals than to the effects on’ formal notices’. This finding 
contradicts theoretical accounts stating that reasoned opinions and formal notices belong 
to the same category.  
Furthermore, there are interesting findings regarding differences between effects the 
instigation and escalation of infringement proceedings. On the one hand, the analysis 
suggests  that  capacity  limitations  are  more  important  in  predicting  the  instigation  of 
implementation  problems  than  preference based  explanations.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
analyses  on  the  escalation  of  infringement  proceedings  to  later  stages  showed  mixed 
results.  Thus,  societal  distrust  towards  the  Commission  significantly  influences  the 
escalation  of  infringement  cases  from  earlier  to  later  stages  of  the  infringement 
procedure. However, government support for the EU is not significant. With regards to 
the ‘capacity’ factors, policy complexity is found to positively influence the escalation of 
infringement cases to ECJ referrals, while government effectiveness does not seem to 
play a role on the decision of the Commission continue the infringement proceeding. 
The findings of this study should be put into a proper perspective. For example, it was 
not possible to directly test the assumptions of the theoretical model. In other words, the 
negative effect of conflict in the Council on the escalation of infringement proceedings 
could  also mean that  compliance  problems  were resolved  earlier  before  the  litigation 
phase  and  not  due  to  the  Commission  behavior.  In  addition,  discussions  over  the 
implementation  process  between  the  Commission  and  member  state  governments  are 
usually  held  behind  closed  doors,  which  impedes  collecting  information  on  the 
management  and  enforcement  strategies  employed  by  the  Commissioners  to  induce 
compliant behavior by member states. 
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